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CASE COMMENTS

WHEN PATIENCE IS A VIRTUE: WEIGHING THE
COMMERCIAL SPEECH VALUE OF ATTORNEY
DIRECT-MAIL SOLICITATION AGAINST THE
POTENTIAL CLIENT'S RIGHT TO PRIVACY
McHenry v. The FloridaBar, 21 F.3d 1038 (11th Cir.),
cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 42 (1994)
Jason C. Meek *
Appellees, a Florida attorney and a lawyer referral service,' sued The
Florida Bar to enjoin enforcement of a rule2 prohibiting lawyers from
direct-mail solicitation of potential personal injury or wrongful death clients within thirty days of an incident establishing a legal claim Appellees argued that the thirty-day ban unconstitutionally restricted commercial
speech in violation of the First Amendment.4 Appellant contended that the

* Editor's Note: This Case Comment received the George W. Milam Outstanding Case Comment Award for Spring 1995.
** To Cindy A. Laquidara and Teresa R. Rambo for inspiring, encouraging, and fueling my
interest in the First Amendment and to my parents for their constant support, love, and understanding.
1. McHenry v. The Florida Bar, 21 F.3d 1038 (1lth Cir.), cert. granted, 115 S. Ct. 42 (1994).
Initially, the suit was filed by both the lawyer referral service, Went For It, Inc. (WFI), and its owner,
G. Stewart McHenry, a Florida attorney. Id. at 1040. Subsequent to filing, McHenry was disbarred for
facts unrelated to this case. Id.; see also The Florida Bar v. McHenry, 605 So. 2d 459, 459-60 (Fla.
1992) (describing the actions which led to McHenry's disbarment). As a result, McHenry's suit became moot. Id. at 1041. WEI remained as a plaintiff, however, contending indirect injury from application of the rule in question. Id. The instant court found that WFI alone had standing to bring the suit.
Id. at 1041 n.7. However, on limited remand from the instant court, the district court granted WFI's
motion to add Appellee Blakely, also a Florida attorney, as a party Plaintiff. Id. Blakely alleged injury
because he would have sent targeted solicitation letters but for the rule. Id. The instant court recognized Blakely's standing to challenge the regulation. Id.
2. See The Florida Bar:. Petition to Amend the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar-Advertising
Issues, 571 So. 2d 451 app. at 466 (Fla. 1990). Rule 4-7.4 states:
(b) Written Communication.
(1) A lawyer shall not send.., a written communication to a prospective client for the
purpose of obtaining professional employment ifa. The written communication concerns an action for personal injury or wrongful death
or otherwise relates to an accident or disaster involving the person to whom the communication is addressed or a relative of that person, unless the accident or disaster occurred
more than thirty days prior to the mailing of the communication....
Petition to Amend, 571 So. 2d at app. 466.
3. McHenry, 21 F.3d at 1040.
4. Id. at 1041.
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regulation was justified because the rule served the substantial State interests of protecting consumers from abuse and preventing invasion of privacy.5 The district court referred the case to a magistrate judge 6 who granted the Bar discretion to order this partial ban because the restrictions were
tailored to address the State's interests of preventing abuse by the soliciting lawyer.' Upon de novo review,' the district court rejected the
magistrate's recommendation and found that the rule handicapped consumers in need of truthful and relevant information regarding legal services.9
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed,"°
and HELD, that the rule's thirty-day ban upon direct-mail solicitation of
potential personal injury or wrongful death clients violated commercial
speech protection because the Bar's asserted interests failed to justify the
restriction."
In 1976, the Supreme Court extended First Amendment protection to
commercial speech, 2 reasoning that the dissemination of commercial
information enhances the consumer's ability to make informed decisions. 3 Although tradition and etiquette condemned solicitation by lawyers, 4 the Court protected attorney advertising as commercial speech
which a blanket ban may not chill. 5 The Court recognized, however, that
holding an absolute ban unconstitutional does not preclude some restrictions 6 because commercial speech deserves only a limited amount of

5. Id. at 1041-42.
6. Id. at 1041; McHenry v. The Florida Bar, No. 92-370-CIV-T-17A, slip op. at I n.1 (Aug. 5,
1992), rev'd, 808 F. Supp. 1543 (M.D. Fla. 1992), affd, 21 F.3d 1038 (11th Cir.), cert. granted, 115
S.Ct. 42 (1994).
7. Id. at 11-18.
8. McHenry v. The Florida Bar, 808 F. Supp. 1543, 1544 (M.D. Fla. 1992) (citing 28 U.S.C. §
636(b)(1)(C) (1988); FED. R. Civ. P. 72(b)), affd, 21 F.3d 1038 (11th. Cir.), cert. granted, 115 S.Ct.
42 (1994). After review of the specific written objections by the litigants, the court was required to
make a de novo determination. Id.
9. Id. at 1548. The district court granted plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. Id.
10. McHenry, 21 F.3d at 1045.
11. Id. at 1042-45.
12. The Supreme Court has subsequently defined commercial speech as "expression related solely
to the economic interests of the speaker and its audience." Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980); see also Louise L. Hill, A Lawyer's Pecuniary Gain:
The Enigma ofImpermissible Solicitation, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 393, 403 n.72 (1991) (discussing
the definition of "commercial speech").
13. Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748,
765, 769-73 (1976).
14. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 371 (1977) ("[Ihe ban on advertising originated as a
rule of etiquette and not as a rule of ethics."). See generally Hill, supra note 12, at 394-400
(discussing the history of solicitation within the legal profession).
15. Bates, 433 U.S. at 382-83.
16. Id. at 383-84 (reasoning that there must be a balancing of the several asserted State interests
against the benefits of First Amendment protection of the advertising attorney's commercial speech);
see also Peel v. Attorney Registration & Disciplinary Comm'n, 496 U.S. 91, 110 n.17 (1990) (suggest-

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol46/iss2/4

2

Meek: When Patience is a Virtue: Weighing the Commercial Speech Value o
CASE COMMENTS

protection, corresponding to its secondary position in the hierarchy of First
Amendment values.'"

Consequently, states began to regulate advertising of professional
services with narrowly-tailored restrictions instead of absolute bans. 8 By
justifying regulations with the established government interest of guarding
against invasion of privacy, 9 states tested the parameters of commercial
speech protection." Thus, the Supreme Court faced the challenge of reconciling2 the value of commercial speech with the individual's right to
privacy. '

Early Supreme Court decisions dealing with a lawyer's First Amendment right to solicit and advertise balanced the State's interests in professional regulation and individual privacy against the lawyer's interest in
commercial speech. 2 In Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n,s an attorney
personally solicited two young car accident victims,24 one of whom was
lying in traction in the hospital.' He offered to represent both injured
victims during these conversations which he taped with a concealed recorder.' However, two state bar disciplinary rules prevented him from
accepting employment resulting from the dispensation of unsolicited advice 2 The lawyer challenged the constitutionality of both rules.' The

ing that restrictions short of a total ban on commercial speech may be permissible).
17. Ohralik v. Ohio State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 455-56 (1978). Although the First Amendment usually prohibits regulation of political speech based on the content of the message, elements
inherent to the nature of commercial speech justify restrictions upon its content. Central Hudson, 447
U.S. at 564 n.6.
18. See Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1796 (1993) (considering Florida's rule barring inperson solicitation by accountants); Peel, 496 U.S. at 91 (considering prohibition against lawyers labeling themselves as "certified" or a "specialist'); Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 447 (considering Ohio's rule
against in-person solicitation by attorneys); Petition to Amend, 571 So. 2d at app. 460-73 (amending
Florida's rules).
19. See, e.g., Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 484-85 (1988) (finding that a unique benefit of the
right to privacy which citizens enjoy within their homes is the ability to avoid intrusions).
20. See Edenfield v. Fane, 113 S. Ct. 1792, 1796 (1993) (considering Florida's rule barring inperson solicitation by accountants); Peel,496 U.S. at 91 (considering prohibition against lawyers labeling themselves as "certified" or a "specialist"); Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 447 (considering Ohio's rule
against in-person solicitation by attorneys); Petition to Amend, 571 So. 2d at app. 460-73 (amending
Florida's rules).
21. See, e.g., Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1797-99 (discussing the protection afforded to accountants'
solicitation of business, and the State's interests in regulating that speech).
22. See Ohralik,436 U.S. at 457-66; Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 363-79 (1977).
23. 436 U.S. 447 (1978).
24. Id. at 449-51.
25. Id. at 450.
26. Id. at 450-51.
27. See id. at 453 & n.9. As promulgated by the Supreme Court of Ohio, DR 2-103(A) of the
Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility (1970) provided: "A lawyer shall not recommend employment, as a private practitioner, of himself, his partner, or associate to a non-lawyer who has not
sought his advice regarding employment of a lawyer." Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 453 n.9. DR 2-104(A) of
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bar defended the regulations, claiming that the State's interests in protecting consumers from abuse and invasion of privacy were substantial and
justified the speech restriction.29
The Ohralik Court held that the bar could constitutionally discipline
the lawyer under the rules because the facts implicated a potential for
misconduct." The Court devoted particular attention to the probability of
undue influence that exists when a professional, versed in persuasion,
solicits vulnerable accident victims.3 After determining that the likelihood of overreaching, misrepresentation, and invasion of privacy together
outweighed the value of a lawyer's right to procure remunerative employment,32 the Court concluded that the bar's interest in protecting the lay
public justified regulation.33
Shortly after Ohralik, the Supreme Court developed a fact-specific,
four-part test in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service
Commission34 to determine whether restrictions upon commercial speech
are constitutionally valid.35 First, the commercial speech must be truthful
and concern lawful activity in order to qualify for protection.36 Second,
the government must assert a substantial interest in support of the restriction." Third, the regulation must directly promote the asserted government interest.3" Finally, the regulation must be narrowly-tailored to

the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility (1970) provided: "A lawyer who has given unsolicited
advice to a layman that he should obtain counsel or take legal action shall not accept employment
resulting from that advice .. " Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 453 n.9.
28. Id. at 453.
29. See id. at 460-61; id. at 461 (reiterating the position of the American Bar Association, which
submitted an amicus curiae brief).
30. Id. at 449.
31. Id. at 464-66. Specifically, the Court noted that "the potential for overreaching is significantly
greater when a lawyer, a professional trained in the art of persuasion, personally solicits an unsophisticated, injured, or distressed lay person." Id. at 465. Indeed, the undisputed facts of record indicated to
the Court that the "two young accident victims ... were especially incapable of making informed
judgments or of assessing and protecting their own interests." Id. at 467.
32. Id. at 457-67; see also Hill, supra note 12, at 406-08 (discussing Ohralik).
33. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 468.
34. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
35. Id. at 563-66. The Supreme Court has applied the Central Hudson test to an assortment of
laws restricting commercial speech, including attorney advertising cases. See, e.g., Zauderer v. Office
of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 647 (1985) (applying "least restrictive available means" scrutiny to Ohio's rule prohibiting, inter alia, drawings and illustrations in attorney advertisements); In re
R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982) (invoking CentralHudson to analyze Missouri's rules restricting the
content of published advertisements by attorneys).
36. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566. First Amendment protection is extended to commercial
speech because of its informative nature. Id. at 563 (citing First Nat'l Bank v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765,
783 (1978)). Therefore, the Constitution permits suppression of commercial speech that does not accurately inform consumers about lawful activity. Id.
37. Id. at 566.
38. Id. The Supreme Court has declined to uphold regulations that only indirectly advance a State
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serve that interest.39
By the time Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Ass'n was decided,' the Court
had abandoned the Ohralik balancing process in favor of the Central Hudson intermediate standard of review when deciding whether the State's
interest in protecting the right to privacy justified commercial speech
restriction.4 In Shapero, a lawyer sought approval from the state commission regulating attorney advertising42 to mail a proposed letter describing his services to homeowners battling foreclosures.4' The commission declined to approve the attorney's letter because of a rule banning

direct-mail solicitation targeted at individuals facing a legal claim.' In
doing so, however, the commission expressed doubt as to whether the rule
was constitutional.4" The Kentucky Supreme Court adopted another rule
in its place.' The United States Supreme Court then granted certiorari to
determine whether the new but similar rule ordering a blanket ban upon

direct-mail solicitation was constitutional.47
Although the Shapero Court admitted that direct-mail advertisements
afforded lawyers opportunities for isolated abuse, mistake, and deception," the Court held that these concerns did not justify a complete ban
upon protected commercial speech.49 Applying the Central Hudson rea-

interest. Id. at 564-65 (citing Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 378 (1977); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748, 769 (1976)).
39. Id. at 565-66. The Supreme Court has since clarified the correlation necessary between the
means selected to advance the asserted interest and the interest itself: it is simply "a fit that is not
necessarily perfect, but reasonable; that represents not necessarily the single best disposition but one
whose scope is 'in proportion to the interest served,' that employs not necessarily the least restrictive
means but ...a means narrowly tailored to achieve the desired objective." Board of Trustees v. Fox,
492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989) (citation omitted) (quoting In re R.MJ., 455 U.S. at 203). Moreover, the
Supreme Court granted discretion "to governmental decisionmakers to judge what manner of regulation may best be employed." Id.
40. 486 U.S. 466 (1988).
41. See id. at 472-78.
42. The Kentucky Attorneys Advertising Commission was responsible for regulating attorney
advertising under the Rules of the Kentucky Supreme Court. Id. at 469 n.1.
43. Id. at 469.
44. Kentucky Supreme Court Rule 3.135(5)(b)(i) provided: "A written advertisement may be sent
or delivered to an individual addressee only if... it is not prompted or precipitated by a specific
event or occurrence involving or relating to the addressee or addressees as distinct from the general
public." Shapero, 486 U.S. at 470 n.2.
45. Id. at 470.
46. Id. at 470-71. The Kentucky Supreme Court replaced Rule 3.135(5)(b)(i) with the American
Bar Association's Rule 7.3 of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which provided in relevant
part: "A lawyer may not solicit professional employment from a prospective client with whom the
lawyer has no family or prior professional relationship, by mail, in-person or otherwise, when a significant motive for the lawyer's doing so is the lawyer's pecuniary gain.' Shapero, 486 U.S. at 470.
47. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 471.
48. Id. at 476.
49. Id. at 476, 478-79, 480.
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soning, the Court found that protecting individual privacy was not a substantial State interest." The Court reasoned that a targeted letter does not
invade the recipient's privacy any more than a general mailing." In fact,
the Court noted that the invasion of privacy, if any, would occur when the
lawyer learns of the individual's legal affairs. 2 The Court concluded that
the First Amendment forbids a ban on targeted mailings simply because
they are a more efficient means of contacting individuals who actually
need a lawyer's services."
In the more recent case of Edenfield v. Fane,54 however, the Court
found that protection of a potential client's privacy was indeed a substantial interest for purposes of the Central Hudson test. 5 In Edenfield, a
Florida Board of Accountancy rule prohibited a certified public accountant
from engaging in direct, personal solicitation of potential clients. 6 The
accountant sued the Board claiming that the rule violated his First
Amendment right to engage in commercial speech. 7
Applying the Central Hudson test to this blanket ban, the Edenfield
Court reasoned that any truthful solicitation may be pressed with such
frequency or intensity as to coerce, annoy, and intrude upon a potential
client's privacy. The Court cited Ohralik for the proposition that consumer protection from these dangers was a legitimate State interest.5 9
However, the Court concluded in Edenfield that the restriction did not
directly advance this interest, nor was it sufficiently narrowly-tailored to
meet the government's interest; accordingly, the Court held that the rule

50. See id. at 475-76. In a strong dissenting opinion, Justice O'Connor stated, however, that
"[aipplying the CentralHudson test to the regulation at issue today... I think it clear that Kentucky
has a substantial interest in preventing the potentially misleading effects of targeted, direct-mail advertising ... " Id. at 486 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
51. Id. at 475-76.
52. Id. at 476.
53. Id. at 473-74.
54. 113 S. Ct. 1792 (1993).
55. Id. at 1799.
56. Id. at 1796. Section 21A-24.002(2)(c) of the Florida Administrative Code (1992) provided
that a certified public accountant "shall not by any direct, in-person, uninvited solicitation solicit an
engagement to perform public accounting services... where the engagement would be for a person or
entity not already a client of [the CPA], unless such person or entity has invited such a communication." Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1796 (alteration and omission in original).
57. Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1797.
58. Id. at 1799.
59. Id. (citing Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 462). In her dissenting opinion, Justice O'Connor contended
that there was no constitutional distinction between a rule forbidding personal solicitation by lawyers
and a rule forbidding personal solicitation by certified public accountants. Id. at 1805 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting). According to Justice O'Connor, both rules should be analyzed under the Central Hudson
test. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also Shapero, 486 U.S. at 486 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (arguing that states have ample interest in prohibiting "targeted, direct-mail advertising" by attorneys).
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was unconstitutional.'
The instant court looked to Shapero to answer the question of whether
the thirty-day restriction upon lawyer solicitation was justified by a substantial State interest in protecting individual privacy.6' Although the
court acknowledged both the offensive nature of solicitation letters addressed to grief-stricken potential clients,62 and the Bar's attempt to guard
against invasion of privacy, 3 the court felt compelled to adopt the
Shapero Court's reasoning.' Addressing the Bar's argument that targeted
solicitation assails the sanctity and tranquility of the home, the instant
court mimicked Shapero, reasoning that the invasion of privacy, if any,
would occur when the attorney discovered that the potential client had
been involved in personal calamity.' This, the court stated, could happen
simply upon reading the newspaper.'
Moreover, the instant court dismissed the Bar's contention that the
invasion of residential privacy produced by targeted solicitations was in
the same category as other types of privacy invasion from which the public had been protected in precedent cases.67 The court recognized that
other direct-mail advertisements are protected under the First Amendment
even though they invade the tranquility of the home.68 In conclusion, the
court held that the State's asserted privacy interest was not substantial
enough to justify the thirty-day restriction upon lawyer solicitation of
potential personal injury and wrongful death clients.69
The instant court dodged the arduous task of independently analyzing
under the Central Hudson test whether the restriction upon commercial
speech was justified by the substantial State interest of protecting against
invasion of privacy. 0 Instead, the court cried precedent and echoed
Shapero.7 ' However, the issue presented by the instant case is really one
of first impression' because Shapero is distinguishable in two fundamen60. Edenfield, 113 S. CL at 1800-04.
61. McHenry, 21 F.3d at 1043-44.
62. Id. at 1043-44.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1044.
66. Id.
67. Id. (citing Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474 (1988); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949)).
Frisby held that a city ordinance prohibiting picketing in front of residences was justified by the
State's interest in protecting individual privacy in the home. Frisby, 487 U.S. at 488. Kovacs held that
a city ordinance prohibiting the use or operation of vehicles equipped with sound amplifying devices
was justified, although it chills some commercial speech, because of the need for reasonable protection
of homes and businesses from distracting noises. Kovacs, 336 U.S. at 89.
68. McHenry, 21 F.3d at 1044.
69. Id.

70. See id. at 1043-44.
71. See id. at 1044.
72. At least Magistrate Judge Charles R. Wilson thought so. McHenry, No. 92-370-CIV-T-17A,
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tal ways.
First, Shapero involved an absolute ban.73 Although the Shapero
Court admitted that abuse could occur if direct-mail solicitation were
allowed, it held that the State interest could not justify a blanket ban.7"
The instant case, however, involves a thirty-day temporary restriction on
such targeted advertisements. 5 The Supreme Court has clearly stated that
narrowly-tailored restrictions upon commercial speech may be constitutional. 6 By simply mimicking Shapero, the instant court fails to re-examine, under the Central Hudson test, whether the State interest in preventing
abuse could instead justify a temporary restriction."
Second, Shapero involved targeted mailings to homeowners facing
foreclosure. 8 Reasoning that these advertisements were non-intrusive, the
Shapero Court protected the commercial speech.79 However, the kind of
solicitation in the instant case "is so universally condemned that its intrusiveness can hardly be disputed."" The instant court asserts that these
solicitations, like non-legal targeted advertisements, are protected under
the First Amendment even though they invaded the tranquility of the
home." This reasoning ignores the observation that the Central Hudson
test "must be applied to advertising for professional services with the
understanding that.., such services afford opportunities to mislead and
confuse that are not present when standardized products or services are
offered to the public."82
On another level, the instant court's adherence to the belief that a
potential invasion of privacy occurs when the lawyer discovers the legal
affairs of the client83 fails to consider the Supreme Court's more recent
slip op. at 15.
73. Id. at 11; see also Shapero, 486 U.S. at 469-70, 470 n.2 (describing and quoting the Kentucky Supreme Court Rule).
74. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 476; supra text accompanying notes 48-49.
75. McHenry, 21 F.3d at 1040.
76. See, e.g., Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 480 (1989); supra note 39 and accompanying text; accord Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S.
748, 770 (1976) (suggesting that Virginia may regulate pharmacists with any number of professional
standards).
77. See McHenry, 21 F.3d at 1043-44; see supra text accompanying notes 61-65.
78. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 469.
79. Id. at 475-78.
80. In re Anis, 599 A.2d 1265, 1269 (N.J. 1992). Anis found that the State interest in protecting
the public from invasive attorney conduct, universally considered as abominable and beneath common
decency, justified the censure of attorneys for soliciting business from a victim's family a mere two
weeks after the Pan American Flight 103 disaster in Scotland. Id. at 1267-71.
81. McHenry, 21 F.3d at 1044.
82. In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203-04 n.15 (1982); see also Shapero, 486 U.S. at 485-86
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) (pointing out particular problems associated with advertisement of routine
legal services, as well as direct-mail solicitation to targeted potential law clients).
83. McHenry, 21 F.3d at 1044.
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reasoning in Edenfield."4 Shying away from Shapero,"s the Edenfield

Court found that invasion of privacy may occur when any truthful solicitation is pushed with intensity that coerces, vexes, or annoys the potential
client.8 6 Clearly, the Supreme Court has altered its reasoning since
Shapero regarding the point at which an invasion of privacy occurs.87
The instant court fails to mention Edenfield, let alone its reasoning.8 To
argue that the Edenfield facts are distinguished from attorney advertising
cases ignores that there is no constitutional difference in analyzing the two
rules. 9 If there is indeed such a difference, then Edenfield suggests that
the State's interests are even more substantial when it comes to regulating
attorneys', as opposed to accountants', advertising.'e
Instead of mirroring Shapero, the instant court could have independently applied the CentralHudson test to determine whether the thirty-day
restriction on lawyer solicitation was justified by a substantial State interest. Addressing this second prong of the test,91 the instant court could
have found under Edenfield that the protection of a potential client's individual privacy is a substantial State interest for purposes of the Central
Hudson analysis.' Very little coercive solicitation would be necessary to
invade the privacy of a potential client with heightened sensitivities during

84. See id. at 1043-44; supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text (discussing Edenfield).
85. Compare supra notes 49-53 (discussing Shapero) with supra notes 54-59 (discussing
Edenfield).
86. Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1799.
87. Compare supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text (discussing privacy analysis in Shapero)"
with supra notes 58-59 and accompanying text (discussing privacy analysis in Edenfield).
88. See McHenry, 21 F.3d at 1043-44 (discussing the State's asserted privacy interest and Supreme Court precedent on the subject).
89. See Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1805 (O'Connor J., dissenting). In her Edenfield dissent, Justice
O'Connor reasoned that attorneys and accountants have analogous powers to "overawe inexpert clients" due to their certified status as experts in a complex field. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Moreover, Justice O'Connor acknowledged that circumstances could be reasonably conceived in which a
CPA, like an attorney, might "use... professional expertise to mislead or coerce a naive potential
client." Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
90. See id. at 1802 (quoting Chralik, 436 U.S. at 465) (noting that "[u]nlike a lawyer, a CPA is
not 'a professional trained in the art of persuasion' ").
91. See supra text accompanying note 37. The commercial speech restriction in the instant case
satisfies the first prong of the Central Hudson test because there is no implication that the proposed
direct-mail solicitations will be either false or deceptive. McHenry, 21 F.3d at 1042.
92. See Edenfield, 113 S. Ct. at 1799. Other federal courts have adhered to reasoning comparable
to that in Edenfield, i.e., that privacy considerations constituted substantial State interests under the
Central Hudson test. See, e.g., Lanphere & Urbaniak v. Colorado, 21 F.3d 1508, 1514 (10th Cir.)
(holding that a Colorado statute, authorizing the withholding of criminal justice records from those
seeking to access them to solicit business for money, advanced the substantial State interest of protecting the citizen's privacy), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 638 (1994); Sciarrino v. City of Key West, 867 F.
Supp. 1017, 1021 (S.D. Fla. 1994) (quoting Edenfield and reasoning that the protection of pedestrian
privacy is a substantial government interest).
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a particular time of private grief and vulnerability.93 Thus, the State
would have a substantial interest under the Edenfield reasoning to restrict
commercial speech.
Reaching the third prong of the CentralHudson test, the instant court
could have found that the rule directly promotes the State's interest in
preventing abuse. The thirty-day restriction offers effective support to
potential clients by sheltering them from soliciting lawyers during the very
period when they are incapable of assessing and protecting their own
interests.94 While the rule directly advances the government's purpose of
protecting against invasion of privacy, it does not effectively limit the
consumer's ability to make informed decisions because the restriction lasts
only thirty days.9" In addition, the rule leaves open other forms of nontargeted, non-coercive advertisement such as telephone directories, newspapers, radio, television, and billboards.96
Applying the fourth prong, the court could have found that the rule is
narrowly tailored to address the State's interest. This restriction is clearly
not an absolute ban.97 Although the thirty-day period was determined
arbitrarily, the Bar need not prove "empirically the objective effects" of
the rule in question.98 Because the Bar's judgment is reasonable, the regulation should be upheld.99
Thus, the instant court's reliance on Shapero overlooks the recent
movement toward recognizing the individual right to privacy as a substantial State interest justifying restriction on commercial speech."° The Supreme Court's decision in Edenfield illustrates the evolution since
Ohralik."' Nevertheless, the instant court's analysis ignores the fact that
commercial speech rights protect consumer access to the information necessary for astute decisionmaking, and not the lawyer's desire to make
money.' Of course, the government should not interfere with a com-

93. See In re Anis, 599 A.2d 1265, 1270 (N.J. 1992).
94. Cf. Ohralik, 436 U.S. at 467 (discussing vulnerability of accident victims to in-person attorney solicitation); Anis, 599 A.2d at 1270 (discussing vulnerability of accident victims or their families,
in the context of upholding a regulation prohibiting attorney solicitation of clients where the attorney
knows or should have known of the potential clients' inability to make a rational selection).
95. See supra note 2.
96. The Florida Bar-. Petition to Amend the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar-Advertising Issues, 571 So. 2d 451, 452 (1990) (discussing Rule 4-7.2(a)).
97. See McHenry, No. 92-370-CIV-T-17A, slip op. at 11; supra note 2.
98. McHenry, No. 92-370-CIV-T-17A, slip op. at 14 (quoting Munro v. Socialist Workers Party,
479 U.S. 189, 195 (1986)).
99. Accord Board of Trustees v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469, 479-81 (1989) (announcing the Court's intended future deference to legislative judgment in matters of regulation of commercial speech); see
supra note 39.
100. See supra notes 50, 55-59, 61-65 and accompanying text.
101. See supra notes 30-33, 48-50, 55-59 and accompanying text.
102. The Florida Ba- Petition to Amend the Rules Regulating The Florida Bar-Advertising Is-
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mercial speech right unless there is a substantial State interest at stake,
such as protecting against invasion of the consumer's privacy. 3 Restrictions which limit attorney solicitation to a period when potential clients are capable of assessing and protecting their interests guard against
invasion of privacy,"'° and interfere with no interest other than efficiency.'"5 Ultimately, however, the Supreme Court will determine whether
protecting the right to privacy justifies restricting an attorney's right to
solicit.' 6 Hopefully, the Court's resolution of this issue of first impression will harnonize once again the relationship between attorney and
client.

sues, 571 So. 2d 451,457 (1990) (relying on Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Counsel, Inc., 425 U.S. 761-65, 848 (1976)).
103. See supra notes 39, 50-51, 55-59 and accompanying text.
104. Petition to Amend, 571 So. 2d at 459 (finding that the Rules are meant to serve "the public

interest").
105. Cf. Shapero, 486 U.S. at 473 (acknowledging that direct-mail, targeted solicitation is "more
efficient" than general advertisement).
106. Certiorari was granted. McHenry v. The Florida Bar, 115 S. Ct. 42 (1994).
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